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1 Abstract
Metrics are useful for measuring systems and motivating behaviors. Unfortunately,
naive application of metrics to a system can distort the system in ways that under-
mine the original goal. The problem was noted independently by Campbell[Cam79] and
Goodhart[Goo75], and in some forms it is not only common, but unavoidable due to the
nature of metrics[MG18]. There are two distinct but interrelated problems that must
be overcome in building better metrics; first, specifying metrics more closely related to
the true goals, and second, preventing the recipients from gaming the difference between
the reward system and the true goal. This paper describes several approaches to design-
ing metrics, beginning with design considerations and processes, then discussing specific
strategies including secrecy, randomization, diversification, and post-hoc specification.
Finally, it will discuss important desiderata and the trade-offs involved in each approach.
2 What is the Problem, Exactly?
Metrics, key performance indicators (KPIs), targets, quantifiable goals, measurable re-
sults, and objective assessments are a few of the terms that get used to refer to the mod-
ern obsession with numerical and therefore seemingly scientific ways to understand hu-
man systems. These trends have led to improvements in business processes, in medicine,
in public safety, and in both primary and higher education. In part as a result of this
success, there have been highly publicized failures of the ever-more commonly applied
paradigm. These occur when the measure isn’t aligned well enough with the true goal,
when the system promotes cheating, or when a formerly useful measure is applied despite
underlying changes that make it no longer relevant.
Both Campbell[Cam79] and Goodhart[Goo75] identified an important failure mode
for measurement, which was later paraphrased by Mary Strathern [Str97] as “When a
measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.” Campbell, who seems to
have discovered the concept first[Rod17], was looking at social science and the way in
which metrics distort behavior and lead participants in a system to attempt to exploit
metrics. Goodhart, on the other hand, was an economist noting a structural breakdown
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in inference about a system which occurs when rules change - a precursor to the now-
famous Lucas critique in economics. The dynamics involved in these failures, however,
are more complex than either discussed at the time, and several distinct failure modes
and underlying dynamics have been identified[MG18], which can be simplified into a few
cases.
2.1 Delineating the Problems
First, a metric that is currently statistically correlated with the goal will inevitably be
less closely correlated once the metric is used, for example when conditioning on high
values of the metric. As an intuitive example, height and basketball skill are correlated,
but among the tallest people, it is unlikely that the best few basketball players are also
the tallest. A similar problem occurs when a metric is correlated with an intermediate
measure which itself correlates with a goal. For example, high school grades correlate
with college success, and all else equal a student who takes easier classes in high school
will receive higher grades - but taking easier classes will not lead to greater success in
college. In both cases, simplification of the metric has important effects; easy to measure
is rarely the same as important[Hub14].
Second, there are times when explicitly optimizing a system using a metric will change
the system to make the metric invalid, as Goodhart noted. Students who sit near the
front of the class typically get better grades, but if a teacher seats the worst-performing
students in front, the relationship will likely disappear. An important example of this
breakdown, and the one Campbell was referencing, is when the participants in a system
explicitly react to the new rules. If the teacher in the previous example announced that
instead of quizzes, they will assign a portion of the grade based on seat position, the
new incentives will make the grades less useful for measuring learning.
Lastly, the discussions above make an implicit assumption shared by both Goodhart
and Campbell, that the goal is coherent and understood. In some cases, however, the goal
is incoherent. A simple example is a committee composed of individuals with differing
values and goals. Because the individual goals can be incompatible, there may be no
coherent way to assign a metric that achieves the different and incompatible goals. If
the choice of metric is a compromise that doesn’t address the fundamental conflict, the
actual incentives chosen may be incoherent. A similar problem occurs when the desired
outcomes are unclear. An example of both of these is the education system. The desired
outcomes of education include life-satisfaction, fitness for the future job market, fostering
the intellectual curiosity of students, or creating informed citizens. These are all long-
term, and thus hard to measure or discuss concretely, are not often discussed by those
setting priorities, and are often conflicting. Unsurprisingly, various intermediate metrics
like GPA, even at the college level, or college completion, are poorly correlated with the
desired long-term outcomes[Cap18] - and the difference is subject to gamification[Hes18].
This is unsurprising - the degree to which incoherent, conflicting, or poorly defined goals
can be achieved is intrinsically limited. Worse, as Deresiewicz argues [Der15], imposing
simplistic metrics distorts education in a way that defeats the original goals.
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2.2 Addressing the Problem
The problem statements above seem to suggest solutions. These solutions are not always
simple or practical, and as we will explore later, the approaches are viable and acceptable
in different areas.
To address the problem of collapsing correlation, it seems possible to build metrics
that more closely relate to the actual goal. In our first example, instead of using height
as a proxy for basketball ability, we can use a weighted sum of height, athleticism, mas-
tery of basketball skills, and experience. This will improve the model, but unless aclear
causal model for basketball ability is found, it will be only a partial solution. In the sec-
ond example, we can explicitly measure the relationship between student behavior like
choosing easier classes and college success, instead of making the mistaken assumption
that correlation is transitive. Unfortunately, investigating all the potential confounding
interactions between high-school choices and college success (which itself must be mea-
sured in ways that are fallible,) is a much larger project, and it still does not ensure
that causal mistakes would not allow other forms of collapse. For example, perhaps
hours of studying is caused in large part by interest in academic subjects, which causes
later success. Selecting students who participate in study groups that then get listed on
college applications would seem to help, but involuntary or boring study sessions might
be due to poor grades and disinterest in the subject, and anti-correlate with the actual
cause of later success.
To address the second problem, of metrics distorting the system, we need a two
pronged approach. The first prong requires insisting on metrics robust to changes, such
as ones using models of the system that represent how the measured quantity relates
to or affects the goal. In the example, if the causal relationship between seating and
performance is understood, the chosen metrics will properly represent the determining
factors of the relationship, such as student motivation and attention paid. The exercise
of thinking through the causes will hopefully make it clear that re-arranging seats will
have minimal effect. While these observations are sometimes obvious, discovering causal
relationships is in general complex. The second prong is ensuring metrics are not being
manipulated by the participants, or at least minimizing this manipulation - via secrecy,
randomization, or post-hoc choice of metrics. For example, if students are unaware that
grades will be assigned based on seat position instead of work done, their actions will
less severely distort the metric.
Lastly, incoherence and debated goals can sometimes be addressed with structured
discussions leading to increased clarity. In such situations compromise is often needed.
Where clarity and compromise are possible, coherent goals are found that can (in the
terminology of the late, great Herbert Simon) satisfice - that is, find solutions that
are acceptable instead of optimal. Abandoning the search for an optimal solution or
compromising on key goals may seem unfortunate, but the alternative of using incoherent
metrics is often worse than doing nothing at all.
3
3 Important Desiderata Across Domains
The “Scientific Management” movement was an early proponent of reward systems sim-
ilar to those seen in use in corporations today; profit sharing, per-task payments or
bonuses, and merit-based pay[CP14]. In each case, the reward is tied to a metric. On
the other hand, motivators are complex, and there are important trade-offs between the
various positive and negative reward factors[Her68].
In addition to the operational challenges, there are various desiderata involved in ac-
tual decision-making around metrics that may be implicated. Metrics often benefit from
immediacy, simplicity, transparency, various forms of fairness, and non-corruptibility.
The exact trade-offs between various motivational factors are a matter of intense em-
pirical focus, but stepping back from those discussion we can see that the desiderata
mentioned are all implicated.
Immediacy is useful for ensuring feedback can be applied quickly, and participants
can learn what is expected. For example, delayed rewards like end-of-year bonuses may
be less effective motivators. Overly complex metrics may be less effective in motivating
behavior, and impose costs on both the participants and the evaluators. Transparency is
important for trust, may be a regulatory or legal requirement, and can avoid principle-
agent problems. Secrecy also undermines perceptions of fairness, which can create issues
of trust. Fairness is also important for legal and social reasons, and even if an unfair
metric is able to accomplish the intended narrow goals, it can lead to longer term issues
and undermine social trust. Corruption, of course, is a more direct attack on many of
these desiderata, and either the perception or the reality of manipulation can do enough
harm to more than outweigh any possible benefit from the use of a metric. More central
to the problems of Goodhart and Campbell’s laws, employees almost always analyze the
system and are intentionally or unintentionally motivated to circumvent the intent to
achieve the stated goals.
The use of rewards to motivate behavior is, of course, not limited to the domain of
for-profit business, and the trade-offs in other domains can differ. Public policy often
uses tax incentives, which have limited effectiveness due to complexity, non-immediacy,
and suspicions of unfairness. In the measurement of autonomous vehicles, a recent report
suggested that the measures must be “valid, feasible, reliable, and non-manipulatable,”
[FBBAK18] implicating many of these same concerns. Punishment systems have many
of the same features - law enforcement is less effective when arbitrary, when the pun-
ishments are often avoided, or when the perpetrators of “crimes” find technical ways
to avoid culpability. Prize competitions are an attempt to use motivators even more
directly, but participation will be limited if potential recipients worry about unfair treat-
ment or corruption. Lack of clarity about goals would be even more critical.
4 Strategies and Trade-offs
The first five strategies are ones involving the process of creating and considering the
metric. These process-oriented methods are not reflected in the metric itself, but can
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lead to better choices of metric. The next five are potential properties of the metric
themselves, and the earlier processes can consider these methods when selecting metrics.
The final strategy is considering the effectiveness of using concrete numerical metrics
altogether, because not all problems can be effectively addressed using metrics. The
strategies are of course not mutually exclusive, and they are often complementary, but
the list is intended to be exhaustive.
4.1 Design Considerations
There is a common temptation, to find easy to measure outcomes instead of choosing
based on how well a measure represents the goals[Hub14]. Unfortunately, this tempta-
tion is too-often yielded to in practice. There is a trade-off between ease of measurement
and accuracy, but the choice should be made based on consideration of the options. In
order to accomplish this, there are three general thought processes that may be useful
in avoiding metric over-optimization failures.
Coherence. If the goals of a system are incoherent, or are poorly understood, it
will be difficult for any metric to capture them. Incoherent (or under-specified) goals
often lead to measuring whatever is most convenient to measure, instead of measuring
something important to the process [Man16]. For example, it is easier to measure lines
of code written by a programmer than it is to judge how well the code performs. In
some cases, the metrics in place serve simply to justify the status quo, or to act as
window dressing. Promotions in companies may in theory be based on metrics, but
if managers can choose to apply the metrics selectively, this can serve as a mask for
justifying decisions made on a different basis.
Structured Discussions and Compromise. In situations of deep uncertainty
and conflicting goals there is often a need for discussion and compromise. While no
compromise can achieve conflicting goals, deep exploration of problems can often lead
to agreements that are better for all participants than the alternatives[RM01]. Unfor-
tunately, these methods require extensive analysis and discussion, and are ill-suited to
many smaller-scale problems.
Causal Forethought. Sometimes the metric measures something related to the
intended goal with an unclear or non-causal relationship. If this is the case, a reward
system using that metric can creates incentives that make the relationship between the
metric and the goal disappear. For example, measuring attendance in class may increase
attendance, but if the otherwise-absent attendees spend their time in class sleeping, or
being disruptive, it is possible that nothing will be gained. A theory of change is helpful
for clarifying these relationship and avoiding this class of error. (See Taplin and Clark’s
book1 [TC12], for a clear introduction to theory of change.)
Pre-Gaming. If a metric is proposed, the exercise of imagining how it could be
gamed, and building incentives aimed at forestalling gaming, can be useful. This idea is
1Available online here: http://www.theoryofchange.org/wp-content/uploads/toco_library/pdf/
ToCBasics.pdf
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closely related to research about the effectiveness of such planning by Mitchell, Russo,
and Pennington[MEP89], which Gary Klein later popularized as a “pre-mortem”[Kle07].
After identifying likely failure modes, it may be possible to improve the metric, or add
explicit conditions to the rewards to thwart the failure modes that were discovered.
Despite the desire to restrain gaming, however, care should be taken to ensure that the
metric does dictate exact methods, which can stifle innovative for accomplishing the
overall goal. For example, measuring hours of classroom time spent by a teacher may
discourage time spent on lesson planning, peer consultation, and other activities that
improve effectiveness of the time spent in class. Explictly requiring each of those specific
activities to account for the potential failure, however, removes discretion that allows
teachers to pick the activities that are most beneficial in their case.
Monitoring Behaviors. Even when well designed and initially effective, metrics
have a tendency to go awry over time as systems and behaviors change. Explicitly set-
ting checkpoints and reviews for metrics may be useful for ensuring that these systemic
drifts are limited in scope. This is especially useful when it is easy it is easy to detect
behaviors which effectively cheat2. For example, metrics often promote a short term
intermediate goal, like sales of a certain product, or short term ad-revenue. Incentives
may start encouraging overzealous sales activities, or placement of ads that interfere with
user happiness or engagement, in each case potentially preventing longer-term growth.
Overzealous sales activities would be visible in lower repeat sales or reduced customer
satisfaction, maknig detecting this failure relatively easy. Designing perfectly coherent
metrics aligned with goals for the system overall may be infeasible, but monitoring be-
haviors that metrics incentify can detect or prevent larger distortions and later systemic
failures.
4.2 Metric Features
Diversification. If a single metric does not align perfectly with the goal, introducing
additional metrics, even if they are individually less well correlated to the goal than the
first, can sometimes improve the system overall. Recalling the example above, the choice
of the best basketball players is better predicted by a combination of metrics than any
single one. In a similar way, it is often the case that multiple different metrics are better
aligned with the true goal than any single metric. Because the different metrics typically
require different behaviors, and they will be to some extent in tension with one another,
they are likely to make gaming harder.
Secret Metrics. If the metric is not known to participants, they cannot game it.
The existence of an un-revealed metric can still incentivise participants to achieve the
goals they think most likely to be measured or rewarded, and to the extent that they
understand the goal but not the metric, this will align incentives while preventing or at
least hindering manipulation.
Post-Hoc Specification. If the metric is chosen after all actions are taken, partic-
ipants view the metric as secret, but because the order of choices is reversed, attempted
2I am grateful to Davide Balzarotti for this insight.
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gaming of the metric can be punished. This may be perceived as allowing unfair discre-
tion, or may lead to actual corruption.
Randomization. Even if a metric is known beforehand, if the weights on compo-
nents or the relative rewards are uncertain, gaming the metric may become less worth-
while. When done correctly, many forms of randomization can also allow much clearer
evaluation of success, which is especially useful for monitoring the usefulness of the
metric or reward system.
Soft Metrics. Human judgment, peer evaluation, and other techniques may be
able to reduce gaming specific to metrics. Metrics are often seen as a way to avoid
subjectivity, but a combination of metrics and human judgment may be able to capture
the best of both worlds.
Limiting Metrics. Failures are often the result of too much pressure on the opti-
mization. By using metrics to set a standard or provide a limited incentive instead of a
presenting value to maximize, the overoptimization pressure can sometimes be mitigated.
Abandoning Measurement. Sometimes, the value of better incentivising partic-
ipants and the potential for perverse incentives issues make it worthwhile to be wary
of what Muller refers to as metric fixation.[Mul18] As he suggest, sometimes the best
solution is to do nothing - or at least nothing involving measurement.
4.3 Desiderata vs. Strategies
The degree to which a strategy fulfills various desiderata is important, and the im-
portance of a desiderata in a given domain can be weighed against the importance of
preventing gaming and the effectiveness of a strategy. We can therefore define roughly
what is meant by the desiderata, and note where there are obvious advantages or con-
flicts that should be considered.
Immediacy: Can the metric be computed in real time? Does it provide feedback rapidly
enough to align incentives?
Simplicity: Is the metric difficult to understand? Will participants understand it well
enough for it to influence their behavior? Are the implications understood?
Fairness: Is the metric commensurate to actual goals? Does the metric provide dis-
proportionate benefit to some groups? Do behaviors that get influenced by the metric
impose costs elsewhere in the system?
Non-Corruptibility: Can the system be used by a party providing incentives to cheat?
Does the metric introduce unfair information asymmetries?
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Immediacy Simplicity Fairness Non-corruptibility
Considering Coherence # + +
Causal Analysis -
Structured Compromise - +
Pre-Gaming + +
Diversification - +
Secret Metrics - # -
Post-Hoc Specification - -
Randomization # - - +
Soft Metrics # #
Limiting Metrics - +
Abandoning Measurement + + - -
The table indicates which desiderata are likely affected by which strategy. Positive effects on
each desideratum are indicated with a plus, while negative ones are indicated with a minus.
Complex interactions are complex are noted with a hash, and these are sometimes positive and
sometimes negative.
5 Considering Applications in Practice
Not all strategies are appropriate in all domains, and implementation is critically de-
pendent on factors specific to a given system and the relevant actors. Still, systems
chosen by public authorities face a higher burden for fairness and non-corruptibility,
while those implemented in private business often require more immediacy. Incentives
intended to motivate non-experts benefit more if they are simpler and easily understood,
and those that impact people or organizations which must participate in a system, such
as employees, or those that involve high reward, may need to be more game-proof.
The variety of concerns that exist make illustrating all potential issues infeasible, but
it is worth considering each of the metric features and seeing how they can help with
the design of better metrics, and how they might impact the various desiderata.
5.1 Diversification
Metrics which amalgamate multiple simple measures are often useful when individual
measures are insufficient. In addition, when a metric includes only some parts of a goal, it
implicitly pushes emphasis away from the others. If reading and arithmetic are each 50%
of the measured outcomes from school, it means that science, art, and physical education
are all 0%. Because the easy to measure parts of a system are quickly accounted for and
optimized for, even rudimentary or obviously biased measures of the remaining outcomes
can offer significant marginal value.[Hub14]. We already measure accomplishments in
math and reading, so adding measures of time spent in arts classes will at least mitigate
the pressure to remove those classes completely - and by doing so, lose important longer
term benefits that are more difficult to measure for short-term evaluation[Hes18].
Disaggregating aggregate metrics can be useful in disambiguating problems caused by
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Simpson’s paradox. Comparing subgroup outcomes directly can reduce the incoherence
of comparing aggregate outcomes, which is sometimes important. For example, Lei-
bowitz and Kelley show examples where different sub-population sizes can make ranked
education outcomes severly reverse direction. Once the success of subgroups is con-
sidered, diverse areas which perform worse in aggregate are found to better serve every
sub-population, making the aggregate metric not only incomplete, but incoherent.[LK18]
Diverse, disaggregated, or compound metrics can also mitigate problems with other
types of incoherence, such as disagreement or lack of causal understanding. This is
because a scattershot approach will tend to limit the degree to which any one measure
influences the system. Designers with conflicting goals can choose measures that assist
with each, and the combination may be an acceptable compromise. Similarly, if the
causal relationships are unclear, targeting multiple different parts of the system may
constrain the amount by which the system is changed due to the new incentives. In
either of these cases, however, the metrics are unlikely to be coherent. Keeping metrics
disaggregated can make it hard to compare or incentivise results, but any method of
combining conflicting or varied measures will make the overall system more complex.
Such complex and incoherent metrics are also much less effective at motivating desired
behavior, since it will be harder to identify how to target the compound metric. The
complexity and incoherence of the metrics can sometimes reduce the degree to which
participants can game metrics, but simultaneously make it harder for the designers to
identify ways that participants may find to game the system.
When goals are complex but cannot be directly measured, measures of various com-
ponents or correlated outcomes can be used. This may make the goal easier to achieve,
since it replaces an unclear target with clear sub-targets, but it may also make it harder
for participants to decide what they should focus on. As in the previous case, gaming of
metrics will be harder, but so will identifying how it will occur and how to prevent it.
5.2 Secret Metrics
When qualitative goals are understood, keeping participants from knowing the details
of the measurement system will limit the degree to which they can exploit the system.
This requires some conception of the goal independent of the metric. In the worst case,
the awardees don’t understand the goal at all, and they will not be motivated by the
seemingly-arbitrary rewards.
This is an effective strategy for preventing gaming, especially when pre-gaming meth-
ods discover important vulnerabilities of the various metrics that are hard to avoid. This
works well if the metrics can be gathered without informing participants, and where the
metrics that would be used are not obvious. The strategy will be less effective at pre-
venting gaming if they can guess or infer the metric which will be used. Similarly, if
the data collection to support evaulation of the metric is visible to participants, such as
requiring them to take a test or gather specific data, it will be harder to hide.
Unfortunately, secrecy is prone to degrade over time as rewards are received and
people can infer what is being evaluated. If a metric must be used repeatedly or in
real time, it will be difficult to keep participants unaware of the details of the system.
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Similarly, if managers or regulators who implement the system are themselves being
judged on the basis of the measured results, or they can be induced by participants to
divulge information, they may intentionally degrade the secrecy needed. For this reason,
secret metrics are more helpful if used one time then changed, as occurs when new tests
are written for students each year - and as that case illustrates, knowledge of the types
of questions commonly asked can still confer unfair advantages.
5.3 Post-Hoc Specification
When results are seen and analyzed before the metric is chosen, there are a variety of
ways to prevent gaming while preserving the transparency of the rewards.
Designing measures completely post-hoc often involves justifying intuition or deci-
sions already made. To avoid this, post-hoc specification should be limited to only
include some parts of the metric. For example, the weights on various measures may
be chosen after all activities have finished, or certain measures may be discarded based
on analysis of the outcomes. If this process is known to participants beforehand, the
potential for metrics to be discarded or given low weights can serve as an incentive not
to game them.
The first, and most significant disadvantage for such post-hoc decisions is unfairness,
both actual and perceived. Transparency in the process for the post-hoc selection can
mitigate this problem, as can ensuring that the decision is made by a party that is
not directly involved. The second significant disadvantage is that the feedback and
reinforcement is delayed, which can significantly reduce the effectiveness of a reward
system. A key advantage is that the post-hoc specification can keep the measures simple
and easy to understand.
5.4 Randomization
Randomization can be used to choose between different proposed metrics when there is
disagreement, or can be used within the metric itself. Choosing metrics via chance may
avoid difficult compromise that leads to incoherent results. Allowing part of a metric
or incentive to be determined by chance can be useful for preventing exploitation. Like
secrecy and post-hoc specification, randomization reduces the direct connection between
behaviors and metrics, which has some of the same positive and negative impacts.
To the extent that the weights and rewards are randomized instead of chosen inten-
tionally, the incentives will be less well aligned with the actual goal. The uncertainty may
also be perceived as adding significant and hard to understand complexity, and reduce
motivation to achieve goals. On the other hand, exploitation is similarly less rewarding.
Randomization can also be perceived as unfair, either because it rewards individuals
differently, or because it rewards factors in a way not proportionate to importance.
Randomization works particularly well in combination with other methods. For
instance, the randomization of the outcomes of a metric based on diverse inputs can
assign random weights to already-known components. Similarly, it can be used to remove
concerns about corruption for post-hoc specification, by pre-specifying the randomization
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to be performed at the end of a time period. If used beforehand to assign different metrics
or different weights on metrics to different groups, it can also be valuable for analyzing
the outcomes from using various metrics and incentive systems.
5.5 Soft Metrics
Metrics can include quantitative but subjective evaluations. These soft metrics are
often able to avoid certain pitfalls of focusing on easily measured quantified values.
For example, peer ratings by programmers will not reward behaviors that help achieve
measurable results like rapid but sloppy development at a high cost to the overall goals
and maintainability of a system. Such measures have their own potential for exploitation,
where participants game the system via currying favor, “sucking up,” or taking measures
to appear more productive than the reality.
Such soft metrics can be done routinely, which has the advantage of providing feed-
back rapidly, but the cost of measurement can be high, if participants need to routinely
spend otherwise productive time doing evaluations. They can also be perceived as un-
fair, and this can also lead to fighting or backstabbing - especially if the rewards are
zero-sum.
5.6 Limiting Metrics
Metrics do not need to be maximized to be effective. If the metrics is used as a mini-
mum for some incentive, the overoptimization may dissapear. By replacing optimization
with what Simon terms satisficing[Sim47], many of these problems can be avoided. For
example, bonuses for salespeople who hit sales number targets is less likely to lead to
overly competitive employee dynamics, where employees try to “steal” credit, or aleinate
customers with overly aggressive tactics.
This strategy is not always appropriate. Steven Shorrock noted that “when you put
a limit on a measure, if that measure relates to efficiency, the limit will be used as a
target.”[Man18] His original example was of flight duty times, where a regulation limiting
the maximum number of duty-hours that airlines crews can work led to use of that
minimum as a target for airlines. Now that they must measure crew-duty times, airlines
try to ensure their employees are as close to the limit as is possible. By introducing this
new measure, it is possible crews are now more overworked than they were without it.
Satisficing can also allow complacency once targets are reached. Climate legislation
limiting total emissions have failed because they were not ambitious enough, and “the
shortcomings identified... are inherent to crediting mechanisms in general” [CHF+16].
That report found, as one important shortcoming, that transferrable emissions credits
were worthless in part because there were too many credits that were being generated
effectively for free. This was made worse because of the ability to transfer the credits
from countries that exceeded the goal to places where the goal was not met. Because no
further incentive was in place once targets were met, there was no need to embark on
more ambitious projects. In such a case, structuring the incentive differently might have
been more effective. For instance, a moderately-sized tax on emissions could provide
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incentive to do some amount of mitigation without providing a potentially unlimited
incentive to artificially game the system the way refundable tax credits might.
5.7 Abandoning Metrics
There are situations where measuring outcomes is too expensive to be justified by the
potential improvement that it could create. This occurs when the complexity needed to
correctly represent the system can require a business structure that is unreasonably or
inefficiently complex[PP16]. In other cases, the measurement system is likely to lead to
distorted incentives rather than the initial goal. The aphorism is correct that what isn’t
measured isn’t managed - but when choosing between not managing part of a system
by not measuring it, or measuring it in a way that makes it worse, the answer should be
clear.
The negative impacts of poorly designed metrics are felt by multiple parties, not
only those who the metrics are intended to help. Obviously, the people who promote
the metrics would prefer if their actual goal were pursued. Anyone who attempts to
target the ultimate goals of the system and ignore the perverse incentives are implicitly
punished for not playing these games, and would prefer better metrics that reward their
efforts. The people who do adopt strategies to exploit the perverse incentives may benefit
directly, but would often be happier not to be forced to play the game of understanding
and exploiting complex, changing, and often harmful systems. Their exploitation of
metrics has impacts well beyond their satisfaction since the economic waste and negative
externalities created by exploiting poorly designed metrics is huge.
Choosing not to manage a system is a decision that should not be made lightly -
especially not before seriously considering whether an alternative measurement might
be useful. On the other hand, putting in place a mediocre measurement system pre-
maturely is often far worse. Until serious consideration has been given to the processes
and alternatives identified above, it may be better to wait, or to abandon measure-
ment, rather than deploy a system that will be ineffective or worse. As Muller puts it,
“sometimes, recognizing the limits of the possible is the beginning of wisdom. Not all
problems are soluble, and even fewer are soluble by metrics.”[Mul18] These limits are
particularly relevant if participants will be drawn to the explicit rewards that are less
well suited to accomplishing the goal than those who would participate regardless. The
limitations are also critical if participants feel discouraged by the extrinsic motivation
and measurement, especially in domains where intrinsic motivation is primary. This
is supported by the empirical work by Rasul et al. showing that autonomy, which is
incompatible with extensive measurement and accountability systems, is more effective
for civil service[RR17, RRW17, RRW18].
6 Conclusion
Despite the intrinsic limitations of metrics, the frequent use of poorly thought-out and
badly constructed metrics do not imply that metrics are doomed to eventually fail, or
12
that they should not be used because they will be exploited. Instead, forethought and
consideration of the problems with metrics is often worthwhile. This process starts by
identifying and agreeing on coherent goals, then considering both what leads to the goals,
and what parts of the system can be measured. After identifying measurable parts of
the system, and considering how participant behavior might exploit the measurement
methods or the measured outcomes, measures can be constructed. The construction
of these metrics to avoid exploitation may involve multiple diverse measures, secret
metrics, intentional reliance on post-hoc specification of details, and randomization.
This may also include decisions about where subjective measurements are important,
and consideration whether measurement will be beneficial. In building the metrics and
decising whether to implement them, attention should be paid to various important
factors in the system, including immediacy of feedback, simplicity and understandability
of the measurement system, fairness, and the potential for both actual and appearance
of corruption in the metric and reward system.
Metric design is an engineering problem, and good solutions involve both science
and art. Following these guidelines will not make metrics unexploitable, nor will it keep
everyone happy with the results of a process. This is true of metrics used for employees,
metrics used for monitoring systems, and even metrics used within machine learning
algorithms - in each case, poorly designed metrics will be exploited. Occasionally, the
suggested process will lead to investigation of potential improvements or strategies that
are ultimately decided against. Despite this, it is a vast improvement on the too-common
strategy of using whatever metric seems at first glance to be useful, or deploying metrics
without considering what they in fact promote. Putting in the effort to build elegant
and efficient solutions won’t fix every problem, but it will lead to less flawed metrics and
better results overall.
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